Jelly-My-Jelly价格

As a delta-neutral fund, we farm funding rates across most markets, so we also had positions in the pre-market of $XPL (Plasma). Our strategy was to short $XPL on Hyperliquid with isolated margin and a liquidation level about 2.1x above the entry price of $0.6, while going long $XPL on Bybit. We had executed similar trades multiple times without any issues. On 26/08/2025, however, a manipulator bought up all available offers and pushed the price from $0.6 to $1.8 within 3–4 minutes, liquidating 85% of open interest - including our position. Even though we had additional margin available, this move was clearly not organic volatility but outright manipulation. We fully understand the risks of trading and accept responsibility for normal market fluctuations, but in this case the circumstances were extraordinary and far beyond typical volatility: both Bybit and Binance prices stayed at $0.6, and there was no time to react or add collateral. This was not simply about a whale’s action, but about the mechanics of how it was possible to force the price up on Hyperliquid while other exchanges remained stable. Hyperliquid provided no backstops or safeguards to prevent this type of manipulation, and the manipulator deliberately chose Hyperliquid to execute this “trade” instead of Binance, Bybit or any other perp dex, which implemented open interest caps to protect their users from manipulation. At the moment @HyperliquidX already announced that they will integrate external exchange prices into the mark price (the liquidation reference). During the incident, the mark price on Hyperliquid jumped to $1.8 while on other pre-market venues it stayed at $0.6. If external prices had been included from the beginning, nobody would have been liquidated, because the Hyperliquid price deviation from other exchanges would have been clear and corrected. In the past, Hyperliquid refunded users in the $JELLYJELLY incident, recognizing that system flaws had unfairly harmed traders. The same logic applies here: loyal users shouldn’t bear the cost of bad mechanics and targeted manipulation. I also want to emphasize that we have been using Hyperliquid since its TGE. We are very active and loyal users, as well as stakers on the platform. We strongly believe in Hyperliquid and have always supported it as part of the community. But if such events are ignored, it risks sending a message that regular users can be unfairly disadvantaged while whales act without consequence - a major red flag that would damage trust and negatively impact future activity. @chameleon_jeff @iliensinc @xulian_hl @HyperFND

作为一个 delta 中性基金，我们在大多数市场上进行资金利率的套利，因此我们在 $XPL (Plasma) 的盘前市场也有持仓。 我们的策略是在 Hyperliquid 上以隔离保证金做空 $XPL，清算水平约为入场价格 $0.6 之上 2.1 倍，同时在 Bybit 上做多 $XPL。我们已经多次执行过类似的交易，没有遇到任何问题。 然而，在 2025 年 8 月 26 日，一名操纵者买光了所有可用的报价，并在 3-4 分钟内将价格从 $0.6 推高至 $1.8，清算了 85% 的未平仓合约——包括我们的头寸。尽管我们有额外的保证金可用，但这一举动显然不是有机波动，而是明显的操纵。我们完全理解交易的风险，并接受正常市场波动的责任，但在这种情况下，情况非常特殊，远远超出了典型的波动性：Bybit 和 Binance 的价格都保持在 $0.6，根本没有时间反应或增加抵押品。 这不仅仅是关于一只鲸鱼的行为，而是关于如何在 Hyperliquid 上强行推高价格的机制，而其他交易所则保持稳定。Hyperliquid 没有提供任何后备或保障措施来防止这种类型的操纵，操纵者故意选择 Hyperliquid 来执行这一“交易”，而不是 Binance、Bybit 或任何其他实施了未平仓合约上限以保护用户免受操纵的 perp dex。 目前 @HyperliquidX 已经宣布他们将把外部交易所的价格整合到标记价格中（清算参考）。在事件发生期间，Hyperliquid 的标记价格跳升至 $1.8，而其他盘前市场的价格保持在 $0.6。如果从一开始就包含外部价格，就不会有人被清算，因为 Hyperliquid 的价格偏差与其他交易所的偏差将是明显的并会被纠正。 在过去，Hyperliquid 在 $JELLYJELLY 事件中向用户退款，承认系统缺陷不公平地伤害了交易者。同样的逻辑在这里适用：忠实用户不应该承担糟糕机制和有针对性的操纵的成本。 我还想强调，我们自 TGE 以来一直在使用 Hyperliquid。我们是非常活跃和忠诚的用户，也是平台上的质押者。我们坚信 Hyperliquid，并始终支持它作为社区的一部分。但如果忽视此类事件，就有可能传达出一个信息，即普通用户可能会在鲸鱼无后果的行为下受到不公平的损害——这是一个重大的红旗，会损害信任并对未来活动产生负面影响。 @chameleon_jeff @iliensinc @xulian_hl @HyperFND